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Challenging the Conceptual Limits in Health 
Psychology: Using the Concept of Conduct of 
Life to Study People’s Health Activities from 
a Social and Subjective Perspective 
Kasper Andreas Kristensen 
Department of People & Technology, Roskilde University 
Roskilde, Denmark 
Abstract 
This contribution explores the connection between health and subjectivity. Up until recently a 
marginally discussed topic in health theories, recent critical research in health psychology 
introduces notions of subjectivity to theories of health. These notions can be linked to 
phenomenology, embodied subjectivity, and psychosocial theories that have moved away from a 
partial, internal understanding of subjectivity. These recent theories tend to define subjectivity as 
a coherence of concrete, embodied and situated subjectivity that extends capabilities and activities 
towards a world of social relations. The article at hand shows that embodied and situated 
subjectivity is a basic function of health that sustains the qualities of human life. To comprehend 
health as a subjective practice in human lives, we need an understanding of people’s subjective 
participation in their everyday social lives. Hence, I will argue for the concept of conduct of life as 
an important concept for health psychology. The concept of conduct of life enables an analysis of 
how people conduct their activities and of their access to life possibilities, within social settings 
and societal power systems. The concept can be used to analyse the connection between 
subjectivity and health in the cultural and social relations by which people actually live. 
 
Introduction 
In health theories, there is a tendency to divide the notion of human health up into 
different concepts, such as mental health, somatic health and social health. These concepts 
may help researchers with focusing on different parts of health processes. Meanwhile, I 
argue that health psychology should also focus on the wholeness of a human being, instead 
of merely dividing up the human being according to different concepts. Mental, somatic 
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and social health should not be divided up, but ought to be viewed as connected processes 
in health psychology. Thus, the human being is to be viewed as a whole subject in a social 
world, and on these grounds, human subjectivity should be considered an essential 
process in human life. My argument is that the concept of subjectivity encompasses a 
wholeness of embodied, situated and social being, and therefore is at the core of human 
activities. So as to theoretically grasp such a wholeness of human health processes, the 
concept of conduct of life could be a viable conceptual tool to understand health from a 
subject’s standpoint in its daily life.  
Theorizing health as everyday life 
In the Ottawa Charter (1986), the World Health Organisation WHO states: “Health is 
created and lived by people within the settings of their everyday life; where they learn, 
work, play and love” (p. 3). In this statement, health is understood as a vital part of 
people’s social lives. Health is rooted in supportive social settings, as in the family home, 
workplace, and educational institutions (Dooris, 2009). And as I will add: health is created 
in people’s everyday lives through their movements in social practices, their learning of 
abilities, access to social resources and mutual care in social relations. The Ottawa Charter 
was the onset of a critical health paradigm in the health field, which broadened the 
perspective on health, with both a social and individual outlook on human health. These 
broad notions of health pave way for critical theoretical thoughts on how the practice in 
the health field could be re-considered.  
Some of the main problems that stem from classic health psychology are that its theories 
study the individual human being without pursuing a thorough understanding of the 
individual’s social life conditions. Another problem I will address is how patients, during 
medical treatment, feel neglected with regard to their subjective everyday life experiences. 
Medical science emphasises somatic injuries and symptoms and depicts health as 
individual, somatic and psychic states. The medical paradigm fails to see how people 
perceive health in their everyday lives. It thus overlooks the major significance of health 
as part of people’s everyday lives. Theories and understandings of health need to 
incorporate a subjective view on inherently social human lives. Against this background, I 
argue that health psychology could apply the concept of conduct of life to analyse health 
as a social and subjective activity in people’s lives. 
Sketching the concept of conduct of life 
The conduct of everyday life is an important concept in critical psychology. It offers a 
theoretical lens from the standpoint of the subject in its social life (Holzkamp, 2013; 
Dreier, 1999, 2008; Kristensen & Schraube, 2014). The analytic perspective from the 
standpoint of a person or a group can be used to analyse people’s subjective participation 
and their social practices in everyday life. In this article, I will shorten the notion of the 
conduct of everyday life to the conduct of life, since throughout my research, I have 
gradually come to realise that people develop their health as an active life-process over 
time, and not in a short timeframe of their daily life activities.  
The concept of the conduct of life is not only a critical psychological concept. The 
conduct of life can be applied as a broad concept that renders it possible to analyse 
people’s thoughts, activities and social relations, for instance through sociological, 
ethnographic, psychological, and phenomenological methods. These methods offer 
different viewpoints on how people subjectively perceive their activities from within a 
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social practice. Hence, the conduct of life can only be grasped from a first person 
perspective and be approached by a person who participates in a group or follows a person 
in his or her everyday life (Kristensen, 2008). A person develops a self-understanding and 
manages his/her activities in the social practices in which the person participates (Dreier, 
1999). Through participatory observation, a person or a group can be explored from within 
their social conditions, if the observer participates in the social context where persons 
conduct their lives. From such inter-related viewpoints, the social conditions that influence 
a person’s or a group’s life possibilities can be reflected through a mutual dialogue 
between a researcher and a person, or with a related group of people. Such social 
collaboration is part of the human inter-subjective and reflective consciousness. Here 
people communicate with each other and mirror themselves in the other, or in the cultural 
and social horizon of knowledge and societal values. By researching such a social 
intermingling of activities and various perspectives, research in health psychology can 
interpret how people understand themselves, how they manage their lives and their health 
in a changing web of social relations. 
In order to unfold and support my theoretical-conceptual argument, I will selectively 
analyse theories and current research that emphasises how subjectivity is vital to an 
understanding of health. I will then discuss different approaches to subjectivity and health: 
in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and cognitive psychology. Recent research in 
embodiment of subjectivity and cognition is analysed so as to exemplify how people 
perceive their health, and how they cope with illness and social problems. I analyse and 
productively criticise existing theories of health that discuss subjectivity, followed by a 
description of critical health psychology as an alternative approach to subjectivity and 
health. I will present a health theory adapted from Juul-Jensen’s (2005) dialectical and 
historical theory of the concept of health. He argues that the concept of health is a socio-
cultural development of various meanings, values and theories about health. The 
understanding of health therefore needs to be interpreted in the respective historical, social 
or cultural contexts in which people conduct their lives. Based on this selection of 
theoretical and research perspectives, I will illustrate and discuss how subjectivity should 
be understood as a social and embodied life-process, ergo a human subject’s activities 
within their social world. On the basis of this theoretical and conceptual argument, I 
conclude by arguing for the necessity of systematically connecting theories of subjectivity 
and health with the concept of the conduct of life. 
Historical perspectives on health and subjectivity  
In this chapter, I will trace the phylogenetic and social development of human health, 
mainly drawing on Klaus Holzkamp’s (1991) analysis of the development of human social 
nature. My main assertion is that human subjectivity and health evolved through social 
development in human cultures. The argument is that guarding and self-preservation of 
life is better suited to a collective structure, in which practice collaboration, mutual 
communication and safety are supported. The establishment of social communities, self-
preservation and mutual inter-subjective cooperation and communication is also observed 
among other natural beings, for instance in groups of animals, flocks, and insect hives. 
Communities of humans and animals both produce hierarchical power relations, which 
affect the possibilities for survival and health in the oppressed and exploited classes of 
beings. 
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The main evolution of human beings has been produced through collective collaboration. 
Over thousands of years, humans have evolved and developed a relative dominance over 
the natural world. Humans have occupied, accommodated and objectified nature through 
the production of life resources. This was achieved through social cooperation, the 
construction of dwellings and communities, collaboration regarding food production, 
tending of animals, etc. The development of collective structures led to the evolution of 
higher symbolic communication in speech, knowledge, and transcendent mythological 
narratives of the life-world. This established stronger relations and knowledge in the 
communities with better prospects of survival and health, via production of tools, life 
resources and mutual nurturing relationships.  
The first human-organized groups were hunters and gatherers (Wood & Richmond, 1999). 
Homo erectus dates as far back as 1.8 million years ago. The Homo erectus scavenged 
carcasses of large animals killed by predators and collected food in mixed habitats, but 
hunting was presumably a minor strategy employed by Homo erectus, who crafted hunting 
tools from stone. This genus died out about 143,000 years ago (Smithsonian National 
Museum, n.d.). Around 200,000 years ago, the genus of Homo sapiens evolved. The 
process of hunting among Homo sapiens was based on social cooperation, and hence a 
stage of developing human subjectivity. According to Aleksei N. Leontyev’s famous 
example of Hunter-Beaten1 (cf. Holzkamp, 1991), social hunting formed supra-individual 
collective coordination, where single individuals took on partial functions to reach the 
goal of the hunt in the social collective. This implies a shared plan, verbal communication, 
sensibility and coordination as well as the use of physical and symbolic tools between 
individuals. Holzkamp theorizes that human development evolved from a phylogenetic 
stage through qualitative leaps to a social nature and a building of socially empowered 
societies through a social economy. The first qualitative leap realized the inner nature2 
that made humans capable of socialization and “develop into the societal production 
process” (ibid., p. 52). The second qualitative leap, Holzkamp hypothesised, was a shift 
from organismic natural adaption to active creation of the environment. However, the 
qualitative leaps that Holzkamp suggests do not only refer to human’s inner nature, they 
also affected the human bodily structure, which was so flexible that humans gained the 
ability to craft tools, communicate knowledge through written signs and through the 
production of symbolic cultural items. Thus, life production in the form of social labour 
developed into an appropriation and objectification of nature, in a two-fold constructed 
objective and subjective social world, built by human beings.  
From the nomadic life forms to local social systems, humans developed other societal 
forms of higher, socially organized civilizations, which were governed by social and 
political power systems in a political and social economy. This governing power was 
instituted by symbolic, military and economic power, as well as by the inheritance of 
power positions. The development of societies implied better possibilities of attaining 
health and prosperity, but on the other side, it also led to strong oppression, slavery and 
																																								 																				
	
1 Leontyev’s Hunter-Beaten is an example of collaboration in hunting, where a group of persons 
produces sounds in order to drive the game towards the awaiting hunters. 
2 I find the term inner nature quite unclear. In the context of the manuscript, I interpret that the 
inner nature is a development of higher embodied, practical and responsive types of 
consciousness that co-evolve with social relations, through the development of communication 
and practices in the human communities.  
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warfare, which in turn generated inequality, poverty, poor health as well as increasing risk 
of conflicts and death for the oppressed populations. 
Subjectivity and health therapy in Hellenistic schools  
In early religious mythologies and philosophy, the concept of subjectivity had some 
similarity to the concept of the soul. The ancient Greeks used the same word for alive as 
for ensouled, indicating that the earliest Western interpretations regarded the soul as 
giving life to the body. Aristotle saw the primary activity of a living thing as constituted 
by its soul emplaced in its physical body (Nussbaum, 2009). Aristotle assumed human 
nature to be embodied in a natural and social world, as a part of his spiritual belief in the 
human soul. The soul was considered the incorporeal or spiritual breath that animates the 
living organism, and exceeds human death in spiritual after-lives.  
In the Greek Hellenistic Schools, the philosophers treated individual health through 
therapy based on philosophic arguments, through collective lectures and dialectic debates. 
This provision of therapy was a treatment for darkened emotions, negative desires, 
knowledge, superstition and false perceptions of the surrounding world. The false beliefs 
the patients dealt with were usually viewed as problematic social values in society, e.g. a 
desire for money, competition and status over other people, as well as superstitious 
perceptions of dangerous spirits and demons and so forth. It was a therapy of the patient’s 
soul to forsake negative desires through arguments, a dialogue for educating the patients 
in order to develop better abilities and actions to promote a flourishing life (cf. Nussbaum, 
2009, p. 15). According to Nussbaum, this form of treating and educating negative 
subjective desires through arguments and dialogues was an anticipation of later methods, 
such as subjective forms of therapy and psychoanalysis. Furthermore, I consider the 
Hellenistic philosophic schools’ model of health education through mutual dialogues and 
arguments to be a precursor of Western health philosophy and health psychology. 
Psychological perspectives on health and subjectivity 
The following chapter critically discusses theories of subjectivity conveyed in Cognitive 
Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology.  
Cognitive psychology and its social extension 
Subjectivity was, and still is, partly scrutinised in traditional psychology as an internal 
cognitive process. As cognitive psychologists Eysenck and Keane (1995) declare:  
 
 [C]ognitive psychology is unified by a common approach based on an analogy between the 
mind and the digital computer; this is the information-processing approach. In the terminology 
of the philosophy of science the information-processing approach is the dominant paradigm … 
in cognitive psychology. (p. 1) 
 
The paradigm of information-processing can be understood as the processing and 
decoding of internal information channels in the nervous system. It is researched through 
tests and experiments. In psychiatric treatment, child psychiatry, and neurological 
rehabilitation, cognitive tests are used to measure the cognitive capacities, i.e. the ability 
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to reason, memorise words, numbers and pictures, the function of the person's work 
memory and so forth.  
Critical psychologist Klaus Holzkamp (2013) criticizes mainstream psychology and 
herewith cognitive psychology for its standard test design. He claims that this research 
paradigm adheres to a worldless perspective: “the real, everyday world which is located in 
comprehensive meaning contexts and ‘in’ which we all live, act and gain our experiences 
is lost to psychology, the test subjects and, ultimately, the experimenter as well” (p. 244). 
He criticises mainstream psychology for producing restricted data through natural 
scientific experiments via hypothesis testing, brain scanning and animal experimentations. 
These test methods are detached from people’s subjective life experiences and social 
activities.  
Mainstream cognitive psychology researches how cognitive processes interpret sensorial 
stimuli and directs the mobility of the human body. The cognitive functions are 
conceptualized as a central executive neurological system that regulate and control a 
person’s behavioural abilities (Baddeley, 1996). Baddeley’s and other cognitive research 
findings show that cognitive functions have a vital impact on behaviour. 
Bandura (2004, 1999) includes a social perspective on cognition, and is a main proponent 
cognitive psychology’s vital for importance of promoting people’s health. Bandura (2004, 
p. 144ff.) claims, based on qualitative and statistical evidence, that social cognitive 
theories operate positively as a method for health promotion. In his theory, he promotes 
people’s self-management and perceived self-efficacy. He argues that the individual can 
change his or her habits if they are motivated and have sufficient knowledge of health. 
Bandura argues that citizens do actually need guidance and help from professionals. He 
states that, “the revolutionary advances in interactive technology can increase the scope 
and impact of health promotion programs” (p. 149). Thus, health guidance can be 
disseminated over the internet as a self-management programme, without larger 
interference in peoples’ everyday schedules, where people can choose a suitable time and 
place. Bandura believes that people must be individually involved in their own health 
practice to create the possibility of change. It is not enough that health services and health 
practitioners take primary responsibility for citizens.  
More generally, Banduras' social cognitive theory investigates how social relations and 
information can change a person's habits through cognitive self-management. A person’s 
habitual dispositions are influenced by social systems, in the sense that political and social 
systems can prevent illness. Bandura therefore argues for structural changes to social 
systems to defy impairment of health and further people's possibilities for establishing a 
sound habit. An example is the prohibition of smoking in institutions, schools and 
workplaces, which led to a decrease in the number of smokers. 
Similarly, in my current research, I find that children with major functional disabilities do 
need professional social educational help to develop their cognitive and embodied 
functions (Kristensen, 2013; Kristensen & Holm, in preparation). To develop the 
children’s cognitive and bodily functions depends on a stable and foreseeable environment 
with continuing assistance from skilled professionals. Their bodily, subjective and social 
capabilities develop in a social and educational environment, through which the children 
gain abilities to manage their lives and understand themselves. Their ability to function in 
everyday life and are the main condition for their wellbeing and health. 
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Freud’s psychoanalysis and subjectivity 
Freud was the first psychologist to thoroughly research innate psychological processes, 
independent of religious pretensions, through a hybrid of empirical science and theoretical 
speculations (Westen & Gabbard, 1999). As a neurologist, educated in natural science, he 
theorised the psyche to be an energy system in which psychic energy exerted pressures, as 
if there existed a hydraulic fluid of the mind. He believed these psychic forces to be 
instincts, such as Libido, i.e. the life instinct (self-preservation and sexuality), and 
Thanatos, i.e. the death instinct (aggression, harm of self or others). Freud theorised these 
instincts as innate drives that powered human behaviours (Larsen & Buss, 2002). He 
argued that the majority of the internal psychological processes were unconscious, both a 
repression and a defence mechanism of unacceptable urges and feelings that would create 
unwanted behaviours, thoughts and feelings. The conscious mind and pre-conscious mind 
constituted relatively minor parts of the psychic topology. In his therapeutic research 
methods, he developed a meta-psychological theory on personality structures and child 
development. 
Freud would later be criticized for developing speculative concepts in his meta-theory. For 
example, Fromm criticised Freud’s internal biological motivation theory of libido and 
aggression as well as his negative view of human nature. He argued that Freud had 
neglected the fact that humans are historically and culturally situated as pro-social 
creatures (Westen & Gabbard, 1999). Recent neo-analytic movements also criticise 
Freud’s psychological and biological meta-theory as being based on vague empirical 
results, with an excessive belief in the unconscious, grounded in theoretical beliefs and 
controversial case studies (Larsen & Buss, 2002). They developed his analytical method 
further by promoting a more equal relationship and dialogue between analyst and patient 
(Jørgensen, 2012).  
The main point here, though, is that Freud opened up for accessing subjectivity through a 
psychological therapy of people who suffered from psychiatric disorders or life problems 
as a treatment of mental health disorders. He did initiate an introspective treatment of 
people’s neuroses and anxieties, revealed in pathological behaviours and conflicts, by 
combining biological, philosophical and psychological assumptions on the unconscious 
and conscious. His intention was to help people to become conscious of repressed 
thoughts and instincts, and to free them from psychological suffering and behavioural 
problems. Regrettably, his ideas promoted a long-standing innate understanding of 
subjectivity. It produced a third-person interpretation and perception of the unconscious 
of a subject’s actions and self-understanding. His talking cure exemplifies a one-sided 
interpretation of the patient’s free associations that did not provide possibilities for the 
patients to influence the interpretation of their own utterances. 
As mentioned, Freud’s theories have been strongly criticised as a rather unsubstantiated 
meta-psychology, although Freud did partly initiate a budding paradigm of psychological 
and social research about subjectivity through qualitative methods. He also explained that 
psychological structures are developing from child to adult through the child’s family or 
other close relations. Hence, his concept of subjectivity partly considered the relevance of 
social relations. The internal psychological (mainly unconscious) structure was influenced 
by the person’s everyday life with others. 
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Husserl’s phenomenology and subjectivity 
Contrary to the third-person interpretations and instinctual assumptions in Freud’s 
theories, Husserl founded a phenomenological movement which analyses the conditions of 
a person’s experiences and conscious perception of given phenomena in a life-world 
through a first-person orientation. The young Husserl, who had previously studied 
mathematics, firmly believed in phenomenology and the interpretation of phenomena as a 
strictly philosophical discipline. He stated that the phenomena should be investigated 
without any pre-understanding, through an analytical reduction of prior experiences and 
judgements. This should allow an examination of the real substance of the phenomenon, 
free from pre-judgements (Zahavi, 2011). 
Husserl’s phenomenology was a continuation of Kant’s analyses of the thing-in-itself in 
his Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 2004). According to the young Husserl, consciousness 
and experiences are intentional. In the human consciousness the intended phenomenon is 
experienced and interpreted in a mental act that produces meaning and judgements. The 
conscious human perceives anything, any object, sound or relation etc., from a particular 
perspective as a phenomenon, and cannot grasp the thing-in-itself in its pure material 
existence. Therefore, human beings perceive the world as a web of phenomena through 
their learned pattern of experiences. Subjectivity could herewith be thought of as a vague 
form of knowledge when compared to the natural sciences, the latter using so-called 
neutral and objective methods to reveal true reality. However, the perceiving of the world 
through experiences and knowledge is a condition of practical use in human perception 
and understanding. The human consciousness is not a neutral objective process, it 
interprets phenomena subjectively. The interpretation of phenomena matters as the true 
reality for human beings. In this world of activities, and weaving of social relations, 
people experience themselves subjectively in the world through their common sense 
perception of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1991).  
Phenomenological methods have advanced health research, and in particular Nursing 
Research, throughout the past 50 years. For instance, Wojnar & Swanson (2007) state: “At 
the core of phenomenology lies the attempt to describe and understand phenomena such as 
caring, healing and wholeness as experienced by individuals who have lived through 
them” (p. 273). Nonetheless, Wojnar & Swanson criticise the individualistic perspective 
which solely focuses on people’s experiences. They further argue:  
 
 [W]hen we consider what is it like to experience caring, healing, and wholeness we cannot 
ignore the lives people live outside of being ill or well. In fact, their very experience of health is 
in the context of family traditions, community values and the broader socio-political context. 
(p. 174) 
 
Wojnar & Swanson’s critique is directed at Husserl’s early strict analysis of the internal 
human consciousness and experience. In his late period, however, Husserl expanded his 
theory into a sociological phenomenology (Zahavi, 2011). He theorised people´s 
participation in a life-world, their inter-subjectivity, the influence of historical traditions, 
the legacy of knowledge in the human collective experiences and inter-subjective 
relations. This was mostly a conceptual and philosophical analysis about human 
experiences and consciousness in a life-world. Irrespectively, many of his conceptual tools 
were put to use in sociological phenomenology, ethnographic and sociological theories. 
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The resemblance between Freud’s and Husserl’s perspectives on subjectivity is relatively 
contradictory. Freud's belief in biological psychic instincts and an unconscious process 
that intervenes into human thoughts, desires and actions, needed external interpretations in 
order to reveal unconscious drives interfering with human conduct. Freud’s notion of an 
unconscious process was different from Husserl’s understanding, in that human conduct is 
based on conscious and intentional processes in which persons relate to phenomena and 
objects in their surroundings. Although they had very different perspectives on the concept 
of subjectivity, they both emphasized the importance of inter-subjective relations in a 
social world. Nevertheless, the notion of the unconscious should not be wholly rejected, 
but should be analysed with other perspectives than the Freudian ideas of a repressive, 
instinctive and unconscious psychic process. 
Discussing the notion of the unconscious as a peripheral consciousness in people’s 
perception of their health 
In the next passage I will convey other perspectives about what could be termed 
knowledge and experiences that are peripheral to the human consciousness. These 
peripherals play an important role in people’s perception of health.  
Schütz and Luckmann analysed in a phenomenological and sociological perspective how 
people perceive their social reality. They stated: 
 
 The world of everyday life is consequently man’s fundamental and paramount reality. The 
everyday life-world is to be understood as, that province of reality which the wide-awake and 
normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense. (Schütz & Luckmann, 
1973, p. 3) 
 
The notion of common sense denotes our awareness of what we take for granted, but can 
we take any experience or phenomenon for granted? Husserl’s method of an analytic 
reduction (epoché) of a phenomenon could be used in order to study how we interpret a 
phenomenon to shield it from the pre-judgements we take for granted in our everyday 
experiences. This method of reduction could suspend the common sense pre-judgement of 
a phenomenon, and change a biased perception of a phenomenon. It shows that our 
consciousness is also influenced by the social values in our historical and cultural 
contexts. 
In his early work, Sartre (1991) criticised Husserl’s reference to an evident self-conscious 
I. Through a phenomenological analysis, he argued that knowledge of our selves is not 
self-evident. The ego is also a phenomenon. Grounded in Husserl’s ideas, Sartre argued 
that the human consciousness is a transparent stream of different conditions of 
consciousness. He understood consciousness as a free floating state of reflection. If we 
had an opaque I, it would impede the streaming of psycho-physical states of 
consciousness. It would obstruct the reflecting consciousness. According to Sartre, the ego 
is therefore a transcendent object.  
Here, the question becomes: How can we fully know ourselves? Do we always reflect on 
who we are, and how other persons’ experience and judge us? When we try to describe 
ourselves to other people, or write a job application, can we altogether describe ourselves? 
This is what I term a Sisyphus question. We carry the understanding of ourselves uphill, 
and fall down again in a continuous process of self-understanding.  
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We reflect on ourselves as an object, a phenomenon which does not reveal a full 
understanding of who we are. We mirror ourselves in social relations and in the social 
practices we are a part of (Burkitt, 2008). Health is a vital part of this recurrent reflexive 
self-interpretation. Am I healthy and normal in the eyes of others? Do I feel healthy or ill? 
How do I or others interpret my condition? Can I at all evaluate my healthiness, if I do not 
clearly know who I am? So, a view on the peripheral consciousness could be that we 
cannot be fully aware of who we are and then cannot be fully aware of our state of health. 
Our perception of our health is a process of continuous reflection.  
The Embodiment and Situating of Subjectivity and 
Cognition 
In this chapter I will show that recent research paradigms on subjectivity and cognition 
went from an innate perspective to a wholeness perspective of subjectivity, in which 
subjectivity is conceptualised as an embodied and situated human activity, contained in a 
biological organism. This will be further explained in the following sections. 
Toward a social understanding of subjectivity 
In a cognitive research project by Clark & Chalmers (1998), the concept of extended mind 
is introduced. They state: “When humans are appropriately linked with external entities, 
the whole arrangement constitutes a cognitive system in its own right” (p. 29). They 
conceptualized this as an active externalism that “concerns the active role of the 
environment in driving cognitive processes” (p. 27). The approach offers an active and 
situated perspective on cognition in an environment. The concept of extended mind has 
provided a new research paradigm for the cognitive sciences, which extend cognitive 
theories from an innate information process towards a whole system of perceptual 
activities in the social surroundings.  
Similarly, in Critical Psychology, the concept of subjectivity is theorised as integrated in a 
person's social activities and practices. It is a critical psychological paradigm of theories 
and research that argues for a psychological conceptualisation of people’s activities in 
their social contexts. Psychology should not study innate cognitive process of thoughts 
and feelings. It should comprehend human psychology from the standpoint of the subject 
in his/her activities in the everyday social contexts. Subjectivity is a societal realisation in 
which an individual subject adapts to collective, inter-subjective relations of social 
activity, knowledge, values and political power systems (Holzkamp, 1979). 
The discursive, critical psychologists Hepburn and Jackson (2009, pp. 177-178) also argue 
for locating causes of subjective behaviour in situated, social, political and cultural 
contexts, where people act subjectively through talk in social interactions. They criticize 
theoretical approaches that solely focus on subjectivity as internal psychological states. 
Language in social communication, knowledge and thoughts are firmly grounded in the 
consciousness of human subjectivity. Activities, perceptions and experiences that go 
beyond what can be phrased in learned language, are also a fundamental condition of 
subjectivity (Schön, 1983). An example of this is that it is not only social relations, 
language and habits that change subjectivity, but subjectivity is also mediated by tools and 
technology that extend the capabilities of a person, and thus transform and extend the 
human’s possibilities for action (Schraube, 2013). However, the ability to act through 
language and with technological artefacts is grounded in the human body. This may be a 
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reason for why Thomas Teo (2009) calls for the “necessity of embodying theories of 
subjectivity” (p. 40).   
The Phenomenological and situated embodiment of subjectivity 
The situated and embodied cognitive research has taken a rather late turn. The perspective 
of embodied and situated experiences had already been thoroughly analysed by Husserl 
and later expanded by Merleau-Ponty in his philosophic explorations. Husserl 
contemplated on the phenomena of the dual perception of human embodiment: a 
performative body and an opaque body as a structure of activities and consciousness, and 
an experience of a phenomenon of our physical structure (cf. Legrand, 2007). Husserl 
extended the theory of the individual's consciousness through a social analysis of human 
inter-subjectivity in a life-world (Zahavi, 2011). Merleau-Ponty (1962) analysed the 
relation of embodiment, perception and subjectivity. In an analogy, he asserts the 
rootedness in a world that consequently besieges the embodied subjectivity, with 
perceptions that provide the conditions of knowledge:  
 
 [W]e have present at this moment to us a perceptual field, a surface in contact with the world, 
a permanent rootedness in it, and because the world ceaselessly assails and beleaguers 
subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the shore. All knowledge takes its place within 
the horizons opened up by perception. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp. 240-241) 
 
The concept of Dasein was introduced by Husserl’s student Martin Heidegger (2012) in 
his widely acknowledged treatise, Being and Time (originally published in 1927). 
Heidegger sought to analyse the ontology of being, which he argued was neglected in 
philosophy. Heidegger claimed that the ignored essence of philosophy was the very 
understanding of being. He said that being is not just any question, it is the question. His 
analysis revolved around the concept or structure of Dasein, i.e. being-in-the-world: a 
unity between the living being and the world. His ontological perspective on being 
encompassed being-in-the-world, knowing, experiencing and the pre-reflective everyday 
activities of the world-at-hand. The ontological structure of Dasein, he argued, consisted 
of care and concern, but not care of one’s own health: It is rather a concern and precaution 
whilst carrying something out – a concern about the success of the undertaking of the 
project of being. His central example is an analysis of anxiety, where he argues that we are 
preoccupied by concern and anxiety of what the future brings. Our projection of future 
trials is, meanwhile, also founded in our memories and past life-experiences. 
Heidegger thus asserted that the question of individual existence in Dasein is revealed 
through a historical process of existing, not as a current contemplation of our existence 
(cf. also Munday, n.d.). This implies a philosophic analysis of who we are. The question 
of who we are is not answered by a reflection of our contemporary being, but instead of 
what we hope to be (Burkitt, 2008). Our contemplation of our own health is also a self-
conscious reflection we project into the future. What can I do to enhance my health? What 
can I do to promote my well-being and life-quality? These questions are based in how we 
predict what the changing scenarios of our social situation will look like in the near future. 
Meanwhile, according to Zahavi (2010), Heidegger’s theory was quite vague in its 
descriptions of an embodied being. It was a rather philosophic and linguistic 
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conceptualising of an anonymous being that experiences and reaches out into a world-
hood.  
A closer analysis of this relation, instead, would require a study of an embodied being in a 
world-space. Merleau-Ponty (2005) states: “Our own body is in the world, as the heart is 
in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and 
sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system” (p. 235). In his analogy, the body is the 
systematic centre of perception and being, which was omitted in Heidegger’s monograph. 
In order to experience something, an object, relationship, a sound or another person, it is 
necessary to be in the space in which the phenomenon appears. Every phenomenon faces 
the experiencing subject in a profile or in a fragment. It implies that the experiencing 
subject must be located in the presence of the phenomenon, through the subject’s bodily 
position. Heidegger inferred, though, that the physical space was not very significant for 
the experience of phenomena. The perception of space was not a physical measure, but 
could just as well be a Skype conversation with the other side of the world, a telephone 
conversation, or the recognition of a friend at a distance. However, if we talk on a phone 
or see a friend at a distance, the placement of the subject is the core where the space 
extends from, and therefore the position by which phenomena, or an object, can be 
experienced and handled (Zahavi, 2011). The body is thus a condition of the coherent 
linkage between movement, and activities, as well as of the contingency of possibilities in 
a life-space (Lewin, 1936).  
Another reflection by Husserl deals with the bodily experience of subjective corporeality 
in action and the objective experience of the body as our own physical structure. The body 
can be felt and watched from its outside senses as a phenomenon, and felt from the inside 
as sensations, such as a feeling of excess, well-being, pain, disease or tiredness. This 
clearly demonstrates that the embodied subject experiences its own condition as the 
particular state it finds itself in. Feeling a state of being is coherent with the subject’s 
awareness of its environmental circumstances. It can be a state of well-being, comfort or 
misery, or a lack of security, e.g. in a work environment or in family relations. Diverse 
sensations in an environment can lead to positive or negative experiences. Thus, embodied 
and situated subjectivity is a vital part of experiencing and appraising states of health and 
well-being, and an important indicator of how to manage and conduct life relations in 
conflictual, social practices. 
A last voice I want to include in this exploration of the embodiment of subjectivity is 
biologist and philosopher Humberto Maturana. Maturana researched the structure of living 
systems. He defined cognition as a biological phenomenon, and argued that living systems 
were “autonomous, self-referring and self-constructing systems”, as written by Cohen and 
Wartofsky (1980, p. v) in their preface to Maturana’s (1980) monograph, Autopoeisis. He 
then defined these systems through his invention of the term autopoeisis, which denotes a 
self-creating/producing living system. According to Maturana (1980), a living biological 
system is self-referring in a circular biological organisation. This circular system affects a 
class of the organism’s entire interactions in a niche of an environment. “Thus for every 
living system its organisation implies a prediction of a niche, and the niche thus predicted 
as a domain of classes of interactions constitutes its entire cognitive reality” (p. 11; my 
emphasis). In living systems, cognition and perception function by observing and sensing 
internal states and external relations in the surrounding environment. Thus, the observing 
and sensing states and relations produce knowledge of an environment, which help with 
communicating with other beings and with becoming aware of positive or dangerous 
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situations. The embodied cognition creates impressions of an environment, of other 
beings, and the beings’ consciousness of its self. By this awareness of the environment, an 
animal or a person will be able to act with care.  
I find that Maturana’s theory shows that being is not only behaviour, but a psycho-
physical activity. This activity is conditioned by an evolving of biological and cognitive 
capacities in a bodily structure, adapted to a particular environment. These embodied and 
cognitive capacities are important for health. Animals have evolved embodied skills in an 
environmental niche that help them to adapt to their surroundings. The cognitive 
capacities are a biological function. Animals can utilise the cognitive observation of the 
surroundings to find food, maintain awareness of their safety and relate to other beings. 
This can be seen as subjectivity in all living beings, which is vital for the upholding of life 
and health.  
However, most animals are closely biologically adapted to a certain environmental niche. 
In their highly evolved subjectivity, human beings are better suited to adapt to changing 
circumstances, through their collective abilities to communicate, learn, cooperate, create 
tools and produce life resources. Thus, human biological and collective capacities exceed 
the dependency of a certain environment through the human ability to manufacture vital 
life resources and live in different environments. My argument, then, is that the general 
human ability to adapt to changing circumstances is a basis for better possibilities for 
doing health. 
Health as an embodied subjective life-process 
The overall conclusion of this latter part is that there is a new perspective also in the 
cognitive sciences, one that focuses on the situated and extended mind. This perspective 
comes close to the early conceptualisation of Dasein, in which the human subject is 
embedded in the wholeness of its social world, as an active embodied relation to its social 
world, and not only an individual condition. Hence, the notion of health should be 
considered as an active life-process relating to the subject’s social world. In this 
perspective the bodily, physical and sensorial capacities constitute a unity of 
consciousness and movement in a living being. The embodied subjectivity is central to the 
sphere of possibilities in the subject’s surrounding world. 
Still, neither the extension of the mind theory nor phenomenology include an analysis of 
the subject’s social surroundings and of how these social circumstances are interpreted by 
the individual in his/her understanding of one’s health. While the concept of Dasein 
analyses the individual being and its being in the world. It does not encompass the social 
conditions or political systems. However, it could be a viable analytic sub-concept for a 
theory, building on the conduct of life concept, in its perspective on being/living in the 
world. The psychological-cognitive research and Dasein, to a minor degree, include the 
embodiment of the subject. Both theories arguably open up for a more comprehensive 
analysis of how people act and experience themselves as a part of a world-hood across 
diverse fields of psychological research.  
Meanwhile, avoiding a theorisation of the embodied subject in its social conditions runs 
the risk of leaving a subject anonymous. The anonymity of the subject in the concept of 
Dasein is quite close to the anonymity of a subject in the concept of conduct of life as it is 
usually conceptualised. Conduct of life is an open analytic concept that enables 
interpretation of how people live in various cultures with different forms of individual 
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capacities. It offers an open and non-normative analytic framework to explore the conduct 
of life, in and across various social and cultural practices. However, I find that it currently 
lacks an analytic view on the significance of the embodied capabilities of a person in a 
social practice, in order to further an inquiry into a person’s concrete conduct of life. 
So as to proceed from anonymity to a subject’s identity, the embodied presence and social 
identity of the subject needs to be more closely analysed. Is the subject a child, a woman, 
a man, a homosexual? Is it handicapped? Is it a foreigner, a person of another ethnic 
constituency? Which historical, social relations and cultural circumstances is the 
individual part of, as well as influenced by? How does the subject present her/himself in 
an inter-subjective relation? How is the subject met and recognised by others?  
The locating of the bodily subject entering into social collectives, where other people 
relate and evaluate an individual’s abilities, appearance, communication, charisma and 
friendliness or agreeableness, is pivotal. The encounter with other people, in particular 
contexts, leads to self-awareness: How am I known? Am I met with recognition or 
rejection? Am I invited into the community? A person can evaluate him or herself in a 
collective and through contact with other people. This has positive consequences for 
obtaining possibilities of being included in social relations, access to vital social resources, 
and for a person’s mental health and self-worth. 
Conduct of life as a theoretical extension of health 
psychology? 
The first chapters of this article traced notions of individual subjectivity in cognitive 
science and phenomenology and argued for phylogenetic-historical as well as embodied-
situated analyses of subjectivity. In this upcoming chapter, the connection between health 
and subjectivity will be analysed through existing health theories. Hence, I will analyse 
two health definitions that incorporate a sense of subjectivity. 
In order to analyse the relation between subjectivity and health, I will throughout these 
final pages argue that the concept of conduct of life can be a very useful concept for health 
psychology. Conduct of life offers a perspective from the standpoint of the subject in its 
social circumstances (Holzkamp, 2013, 2016). It integrates the subject’s self-
understanding and understanding of its participation in social practice structures (Dreier, 
1999). What people find meaningful can be grounded in various beliefs and perceptions 
within social practices. It is seldom a utopian and unattainable project, but rather a 
discernment of what makes common sense in a person’s contemporary situation. It is a 
kind of cost-benefit analysis that colonises a person’s perception of the accessible 
possibilities, in their sense of reality. 
The conduct of life allows for an empirical investigation of the subject’s realising of its 
life practices and hence its qualities in life. The subjective perspective should not be 
understood individually, it should be understood inter-subjectively in the different social 
contexts and practices, where the person participates in her/his course of everyday life. If a 
person should maintain health and well-being, he or she needs to learn to organise their 
changing participations in social practices. The concept of the conduct of life can be used 
to study how a subject tries to pursue and develop a valuable life, with health and well-
being as vital outcomes. 
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Subjectivity in Nordenfelt’s and Antonovsky’s health theories 
In order to study people’s health activities, it is impossible to avoid a conceptualisation of 
subjectivity in health theories. Even if there are theories that define health negatively as 
simply being free from illness, handicap and vulnerability (Boorse, 1977), such theories 
are dependent on human experiences of body symptoms and problems with physical and 
psychological functions in everyday life, so as to establish diagnoses, health examinations 
and evaluations of the effects of a treatment. 
Nordenfelt (1987) defines health from an action theory perspective: “A person’s health is 
characterized as his ability to achieve his vital goals” (p. xi). Nordenfelt does state, 
however, that there is not a clearly definable concept of health. There are, nevertheless, 
highly inter-related forms of the concept (pp. xii-xiii). Producing tentative definitions can 
help progress towards understandings of health in health practices. For instance he 
discusses what the meaning of vital goals are: a) the vital goals of man can be deduced 
from his vital needs (need-theory); b) the vital goals of man are identical to the goals that 
he himself sets during the course of his life (the subject-theory). Through a critique of 
these tenets, he concludes that “the vital goals of a human being are goals whose 
fulfilment is necessary and jointly sufficient for the minimal happiness of their bearer” (p. 
xv). He gathers that minimal happiness requires normal circumstances, i.e. neither war, 
nor conflict, nor disease. The vital needs can be supported by family and healthcare 
personnel.  
I consider Nordenfeldt’s concept of happiness as a sign of health, within his broader 
theory of welfare. This tentative notion of health connects capabilities of vital goals in life 
with the subjectivity of happiness. The concept of happiness is hardly a core process of 
health. It is rather a sign of welfare, in a subject who manages well in life.  
A second health theory, which explicitly conceptualizes subjectivity, is Aaron 
Antonovsky’s theory of the sense of coherence [SOC]. He argues against the perspective 
of pathogenesis in health practices and takes a view on the processes of health that 
prevents stressors and illness, which he terms salutogenesis. His definition of SOC is: 
  
 A global orientation that expresses the extent to which one has a pervasive, enduring though 
dynamic feeling of confidence that (1) the stimuli deriving from one's internal and external 
environments in the course of living are structured, predictable and explicable; (2) the resources 
are available to one to meet the demands posed by these stimuli; and (3) these demands are 
challenges, worthy of investment and engagement. (Antonovsky, 1987, p. 19) 
 
The complex concept of SOC has three components: comprehensibility, manageability, 
and meaningfulness. Comprehensibility is the understanding of internal and external 
stimuli. Manageability is the ability to cope, be supported, and control events and 
situations in life. Meaningfulness is the strong belief of a purpose and meaning in life. 
Antonovsky found that the concept of meaning was essential. It is the basis of motivation 
and purpose in life to fight problems as challenges. He argued for qualitative methods to 
understand the stressors and problems in people’s life situations, through biographic 
interviews. The threefold concept of SOC suggests a phenomenal investigation of people’s 
management of stressors in their life circumstances, and their capacities to prevent stress 
and illness. 
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The health theories by Nordenfelt and Antonovsky are theories of practising health 
through active human subjectivity. They both emphasise the individual’s activities, for 
example the active relating to values, meanings and purposes on the grounds of their life 
conditions. However, the theories underdetermine the actions of people in contextual 
settings, and tend to be normative in defining individuals’ health. Although the theories 
have contemporary and contextual merits, they do not incorporate wider notions of health 
in other historical and cultural contexts. Albeit these conceptual theories can help point 
out important psychological factors in health, their perception of health needs to be 
extended by empirical research in the different social or cultural contexts, where people 
actually conduct their lives. 
Juul-Jensen’s dialectic health theory 
Philosopher Juul-Jensen (2005) argues for a dialectic and historical theoretical 
understanding of the health concept. In this approach, the diversity of health concept stems 
from changing historical, cultural and local factors. Through his dialectical analysis of 
differing historical and cultural life-forms, he asserts that the concept of health should be 
viewed as a plastic linguistic sign. He then argues that health is not a universal or 
essentialist concept. This is substantiated through the multiplicity of health definitions and 
cultural perceptions of health.  
These different cultural perceptions could be analysed via social constructionist methods. 
However, social constructionism could be criticised as a relativistic perspective: Do all 
social and cultural values truly make sense? Still, social constructionism can analyse a 
complexity of social and cultural discursive notions of health within a particular social 
context, and then analyse these notions critically. It could be seen as closely related to 
dialectic health theories. The historical dialectic perspective does also open up for 
opposing perspectives of health, but it is not entirely relativistic because it generates a 
synthesis of knowledge over time. It does not unify opposing cultural or social perceptions, 
but interprets a conceptual core of consensus between opposing theories or cultures. Over 
time, it can synthesise knowledge of opposing forces, in the balancing point, where they 
meet and struggle.    
From this dialectical perspective, Juul Jensen (2005, p. 16) claims that a synthesis of the 
differing concepts and perceptions of health is bound to the concept of life. The concept of 
human life does not offer a unified conception. Rather, it is a multi-faceted conceptual 
notion. There is a high level of diversity between the billions of people in the world, living 
in very different social situations. It is therefore indisputable that human life is complex. 
Juul-Jensen argues that to understand health as a process in life, we should interpret the 
different perceptions of qualities in life. Such qualities have different meanings in various 
social and cultural contexts. His theory offers a conceptual openness to how qualities in 
life are changing through history and in individual life-forms. Therefore, an analysis of 
health or qualities of life should be empirically interpreted from within the social or 
cultural settings in which people live. Thus, the analytic and empirical concept of conduct 
of life and related methods can help to analyse the perceptions of health, i.e. the qualities 
of life, in various historical, societal and cultural locations. 
Subjectivity in critical health psychology 
Critical Health Psychology [CHP] works out critical alternative theories and practices 
against traditional mainstream health psychology. Critical theories and perspectives on 
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health operate primarily within the social domain of citizen groups that are badly off in 
life. They are in the public media stigmatised as a separate class or a category of a group 
of humans. This could for instance be sex workers, drug users, unemployed, war refugees, 
homeless or dysfunctional persons. The aim of CHP is to offer an understanding of social 
conditions and social help, as mandatory condition for shaping a life of well-being. It 
analyses health problems for people with psycho-social problems, few material and social 
resources, and who are alienated from social recognition. 
In a review of CHP, Chamberlain & Murray (2009) present methods to treat poverty and 
the lack of social recognition through means such as art, theatre, documentaries and 
literature. The idea is to attract popular media and to rouse the public and politicians so 
that they may understand the social predicaments (such as poverty) that are impacting 
health and well-being. Via such methodological approaches, the involved groups can 
convey authentic voices in the light of their difficult social conditions. In these social 
collective therapeutic practices, the involved participants stand out with their subjectivity 
narrating their stories. Playing them out in art, theatre or documentaries, for example, can 
provide a detailed description of the participant’s perception of their lives in relation to 
their life conditions. The participants, then, reach out to an audience, in order to illustrate 
their subjective standpoint in their life story and everyday conduct of life, and to find 
recognition in the group collective and in relation to a public audience. It is a way to de-
stigmatise a person, and understand how the person gets stuck in a problematic state of 
affairs. 
The idea behind the use of narratives in theatre, pictures and literature is to change social 
and political structural problems that lead to unhappiness and an unhealthy and unfulfilled 
life. In Freire’s (1993) book Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the marginalized groups were 
taught to stand together and to develop a critical consciousness of the historical social 
predicament in which they find themselves (cf. also Guzzo, Moreira & Mezzalira, 2015). 
It is an empowerment method for groups to struggle against the political field of 
oppressive powers, and shape possibilities for changing their understanding and social 
situation through collective actions and knowledge. The groups communicate their 
intimate everyday knowledge and their subjective forces, to better be able to collectively 
express the problems in their social situation. It can be analysed as a subjective voicing of 
individuals and groups in their conduct of life. 
The marginal awareness of human subjectivity in 
medical practice 
In medical treatment, there are problems identifying people’s understanding of their 
everyday life. The doctor asks the patient about his or her symptoms at the beginning, 
during and at the end of a treatment. Throughout these inquiries, the patient’s symptoms 
are normally articulated as bodily sensations, separated from a wider contextual 
understanding. Medical treatments do have a vital importance in the health field. The 
health systems ensure better life possibilities for the population. Medical treatments are a 
scientific, highly skilled and educated craft for a somatic cure. Corporeal diseases cannot 
fully be perceived through the superficial analysis of symptoms. It requires somatic 
examinations such as X-ray, scanning, and blood tests to examine interior injuries. 
Somatic treatment is analogous to performing a check-up on a car, repairing a bicycle or 
updating a computer. It can produce better physical and psycho-social functioning, but the 
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somatic perspective leaves little time to investigate the problems in everyday lives. Many 
patients therefore become frustrated by the doctor’s dominance over medical treatment 
and medicine prescriptions, also their reluctance to inquire into the patient’s social 
situation and stressful symptoms, which are of crucial importance for understanding the 
patient’s changing functionality in everyday life. The health problem could (also) be 
related to anxiety about losing a job, a partner or losing potential welfare subsistence.  
Research shows that patients often complain about the doctor’s lack of investigation of the 
patient’s life situation throughout medical examination procedures (Elsass, 1992). Even 
though scientific medical methods have strong effects on some diseases, the proportion of 
suffering patients has not decreased. Many contacts with the medical system are initiated 
due to minor somatic symptoms, relating to stress and psychological problems and 
anxieties in everyday life. Thompson (1984, referenced in Elsass, 1992) found that 
patients’ discontent leads to a large proportion of patients who do not follow the doctor’s 
treatment prescriptions, which in turn leads to less effective treatment processes. These 
patients experience a higher level of side effects. This means that many patients return to 
the doctors to be treated, or alternatively change doctor because they are discontent with 
their treatment (Elsass, 1992). However, the pressure caused by the high numbers of 
patients rarely gives time for engaging in dialogue about the social problems in the 
patient’s life situation, because the brief time available is normally exclusively devoted to 
medical treatment procedures. 
The WHO’s Ottawa Charter (1986) developed a broad health concept, in which health is 
conveyed as part of a person’s active and productive process of living. On the grounds of 
this broad perspective on the concept of health, practitioners and experts should adjust 
their perspectives to an understanding of people’s participation in everyday life, from 
people’s subjective perspectives on their values and participation in a social world (Potvin 
& McQueen, 2007). McQueen (2007) criticises health science for their lack of consistent 
theorising of how people perceive health in their social contexts. Since all human actions 
are produced in social contexts and relate to social practice, the medical somatic 
perspective alone is hardly sufficient. This is because the behaviour of a subject and 
interventions of health-care change the relations of health in the conduct of everyday life. 
McQueen asserts that “health promotion theory cannot be based on a notion that the 
whole can be reduced” (ibid, p. 34). Reductionist methods for investigating human actions 
do not produce valid knowledge across social contexts. Research into health practice 
should instead focus on the process of people’s subjective activities and participation in 
the flow of structural changes in social settings.  
I therefore argue that causal explanations of the activities of people’s health practices do 
not explain dynamic changes in their conduct of life. These explanations cannot 
comprehensively conceptualise the complexity of human health processes. It requires 
qualitative methods that account for people’s concrete situations within their life-settings. 
The practice of health is produced by people’s participation in everyday life in a process 
of self-management, social nurture and social systems. It happens within social contexts in 
a nexus of social powers (Potvin & McQueen, 2007).  
Concluding thoughts 
My argument is that health can be conceived of as an embodied and situated life-process 
in the conduct of life. The major theories of health psychology tend to concentrate on the 
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individual’s mental health, positive or negative feelings, cognitive capacities, and health 
behaviour. However, to conduct an everyday life is an embodied inter-subjective 
performance in a social world. In a modification of an analogy of Merleau-Ponty (1962), I 
state: Embodied subjectivity is the heart of human practice, and therefore a vital structure 
for the preservation of human-life qualities. The practical realisation of everyday life is 
placed within a world, its practice structures, social relations and political systems. Thus, 
subjectivity is not an individualistic concept, but encompasses an embodied relational 
existence, where people move and change in the course of social activities across the 
structures of a life-world. The concept of conduct of life can be used to analyse people’s 
perception of their health and life qualities, in their everyday cultural and social settings. 
Due to historical changes, cultural and individual differences, health cannot be defined as 
an absolute concept. It is a multi-faceted process situated in various individual, social and 
cultural circumstances. The definitions of health need a dialectical analysis of the qualities 
in human lives. Research definitions can approach the concept of health from various 
angles and help communicate and understand vital processes of human life. In this 
context, the open concept of conduct of life can be a valuable concept through which we 
can analyse the connection between health and subjectivity in the practising of human 
lives. The pathological or somatic medical perspective does not adequately conceptualise 
health, because the practice of health is also an active and conscious structure grounded in 
human social practice. Meanwhile, medical treatment and human practice are dialectically 
dependent on each other and should merge subjective and objective perspectives in the 
practice of health. The subject’s conduct of life is dependent on access to life resources, 
social recognition, avoidance of unstable social conflicts and oppression. A human subject 
is not merely a solitary living being, it is also an embodied subject, subjected to a world of 
social powers. This leads to the necessity of public and political (health) organisations to 
create collective empowerment through promoting better living conditions, within the 
social structures of societies.  
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